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Human bodily life is a great personal good. It is a good of the person and 
not merely for the person. Such life is inherently good and not merely 
instrumental to other goods. This philosophical starting point is 
profoundly and emphatically nondualistic: human bodily life is neither a 
nonhuman nor a subhuman good, but a true human good of the person. I To 
say that a human person lacks value if incapable of cognitive and affective 
function is to reduce human personal life to a good not inherent but merely 
instrumental to other goals.2 
A patient in a persistent vegetative state is alive. Such a patient is not 
dying unless from some underlying disease separate and distinct from the 
persistent vegetative state. The patient is not in a state of suspended 
animation from which all possibility of recovery is foreclosed. The 
persistent vegetative state should be distinguished from coma. Coma and 
vegetative state are states devoid of consciousness. In order to be 
conscious, the patient must be awake and aware. A patient in a coma is 
neither awake nor aware. A patient in a vegetative state is awake but not 
aware. Awareness requires wakefulness but wakefulness can be present 
without awareness. It is the wakefulness of the vegetative state that those at 
the bedside find so unnerving - both family and physician. 
The Multi Society Task Force on the medical aspects of PVS 
specified a set of seven criteria for the diagnosis of the vegetative state: 
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I ) No ev idence of awareness of self or environment and an inability to 
interact with others. 
2) No evidence of sustai ned, reproducible, purposeful or voluntary 
behavioral responses to visual , auditory, tactile or noxious stimuli. 
3) No evidence of language comprehension or expression. 
4) Intermittent wakefulness and sleep-wake cyeles. 
5) Sufficiently preserved hypothalamus and brain stem autonomic 
function to permit survival with medical and nursing care. 
6 ) Bowel and bladder incontinence. 
7) Variably preserved cranial nerve reflexes and spinal reflexes. 
Criteria 1-3 are negative and 4-7 are positive. Furthermore, criteria 2 
and 3 are subservient to criterion 1. If a patient lacks awareness of self, he 
will not respond to stimuli or language. The diagnosis therefore really 
comes down to one central criterion, i.e. no evidence of awareness of self 
or environment. If this continues for a month, the patient is said to be in a 
persistent vegetative state. After a year of persi stence without 
improvement, the patient is said to be in a permanent vegetative state. 
Reliability of Diagnosis an Issue 
How reliable, then, is the diagnosis ofPVS? Two distinct possibilities 
qualify the reliability of the diagnosis. I) The patient does exhibit evidence 
of awareness but the diagnostician has missed the relevant evidence and, 2) 
The patient does not exhibit any evidence of awareness but does, 
nevertheless, retain some measure of awareness. The evidence that some 
PYS patients may experience pain would imply that they are not devoid of 
awareness. 
Evidence for lack of awareness may be established by 1) motor 
responses to stimuli , 2) cortical glucose consumption and 3) anatomical 
evidence of lesions so profound that awareness would not be retained. We 
should remember that when Karen Quinlan died, her autopsy showed that 
most of her cerebral mantle was intact. 
It must be acknowledged that the cause of the vegetative state can 
relate to its prognosis. Non-traumatic injuries to the central nervous system 
have a worse prognosis than those that are traumatic. In any event, the use 
of the term "permanent" is really creating a false impression of certainty of 
irreversibility since the most we are entitled to say in any case is that 
recovery of consciousness is "unlikely." Even if PYS has been deemed 
permanent by Task Force standards it is not correct to say that recovery of 
consciousness is " impossible." 
This is important because of studies that have been done which 
involve polls taken of normal persons thinking prospectively about the 
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poss ibility of life in a persistent vegetati ve state. These studies have posited 
the noti on of life in PVS wirhout possibility of recovery.4.5 These studies 
would support the presumpti on that a majority (but not al l) of people 
would choose prospective ly to rej ect life-sustaining treatment if the 
presumpti on was that they would never recover consciousness. They would 
infer that such a life would be meaningless and burdensome to others. 
However, if we hones tly foc us on prognostic uncertainties (not to mention 
mi staken di agnosis) , some patients might come to a different conclusion . 
Some mi ght conclude that ex istence in a state of impaired consciousness 
would not be a fate worse than death . One wonders what polls would show if 
people were asked if they wanted to be starved to death. One philosopher6 
suggests that a version of Pascal's wager applies to PVS. Since the re is a 
possibili ty however slight that a PVS patient might regain consciousness, 
S tone states, " You have everything to win and nothing to lose if you 
gamble o n stay ing ali ve. Yo u may wake up and, if you do not, unconscious 
li fe is no worse than being dead. Thi s argument concludes that it is in your 
interest to stay alive, the more so the younger you are." Recent dramatic 
cases of unex pected awakening in patients who had been in persistent 
vegetati ve states fo r as long as 20-30 years lend credence to thi s wager. 
More recent techno logies such as cerebral glucose metabolism, 
pos itive emi ss ion tomography and cerebral blood fl ow studies and 
rad ioisotopi c imaging have complicated rather than clarified prognosis and 
di agnosis of entities such as the minimally conscio us state7 and the locked-
in syndrome .' 
Dec isions to withhold or withdraw life-susta ining treatments for 
pati ents who have become incompetent may ari se in various contexts. If 
instructiona l advance directi ves are in place, decisions are based on these 
instructional stipulati ons. If proxy directives are in place, health care 
prov iders woul d ordinarily fo llow the stipulations of the proxy health care 
agent. If there are no directi ves, as is frequently the case, the treatment 
team must identify a surrogate decision maker, ordinarily a family member 
or c lose personal fri end . The understanding is that the surrogate would 
apply the substituted judgment standard. If no re liable basis exists for a 
substituted judgment, the sun'ogate would retreat to a best interest standard. If 
at any point the attending phys ician feels that the decision is contrary to hi s 
ethical princ ipl es and/or violates the patient's best interests, he must be free 
to refuse to concur and paI1ic ipate in the carry ing out of the decision. 
In the real world , conflict situations ari se among patients who are in a 
pers istent vegetative state and are nor dying . Virtuall y every litigated case 
in the United States involved a patient who was not dying and in whom the 
dec ision to withhold food and drink would be the proximate cause of 
death . In such instances, the continuation of feedings does not constitute 
ex traordinary care. The use of nasogastric feedings is probably a century 
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old and gastrostomies have been employed for at least 50 years and have 
become less invasive as laparoscopic methods have been perfected. 
Therefore the allegations that decisions regarding such feedings are a result 
of advances in life saving technologies are moot. Such feedings are 
frequently described as "artificial" nutrition and hydration. This is a 
misnomer, however, since tube feedings contain water, calories, protein, 
carbohydrates, fat, vitamins, etc. , none of which is artificial. The same 
material used for tube feeding is also employed for dietary supplements in 
conscious patients on special diets. The appropriate term is not "artificial" 
feedings but "assisted" feedings. That is , the delivery of natural hydration 
and nutrition through a conduit. Some theoiogians8 state that assisted 
feedings are the treatment for the "fatal pathology" consisting in the 
inability to chew and swallow. The nerves and muscles of deglutition are 
intact in PYS, however, and when patients awake from PYS, they awaken 
with the ability to chew and swallow as long as they remain conscious. No 
human being has ever survived to adulthood without assisted feeding since 
we are all born dependent upon it through infancy. The placing of a 
nasogastric tube by a nurse or the insertion of a gastrostomy by a physician 
may be a medical procedure. Feeding the patient through these conduits, 
however, is not a medical procedure, since lay people at the bedside in the 
home can perform it. Feeding the unconscious patient is ordinary care. In 
the celebrated court cases in which the court orders discontinuation of 
ANH the gastrostomy is typically not removed but hydration and nutrition 
are withheld. The effect of the court order then is thus not to discontinue 
medical treatment but to forego ordinary care. Providing this care is an 
important symbol of our human relatedness and commitment. Denying 
such care poses a serious threat to the relationship between the doctor and 
the patient as well as the relationship between the health care facility and 
the patient. Permitting the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration 
undermines the psychological separation between killing and letting die. 
Whether a patient is in a vegetative state or not is a medical question. 
Whether a patient should live or die is not merely a medical question. It is a 
complex moral, legal, philosophical social question. 
Caring for the unconscious patient is an opportunity for the physician 
to recover the understanding that there remains a residual human 
wholeness, however precarious that can be served even in the face of the 
incurable. 
Dying of dehydration and starvation must be a singularly unpleasant 
way to die. We have much testimony to that effect from those who were 
shipwrecked or trapped in a storm and almost starved or died from thirst. 
Some advocates declare categorically that comatose people are unaware of 
such discomfort. And yet we know from studies that some comatose 
patients have changes in heart rate, respiratory rate and other physiological 
202 Linacre Quarterly 
changes when merely spoken to lovingly at the bedside. How can we be so 
confident that they escape the agonies of starvation? In all of these cases 
we have testimony from nurses and relatives that watching a patient die 
from starvation and dehydration is a terrible experience for spectators. 
How long will it be before someone suggests that the more humane thing 
to do would be to put an end to the misery with a bolus of KCI? 
In all candor we act mostly out of ignorance. We consign patients to 
hopelessness without research and investigation. In Israel, combat soldiers 
in coma were placed in an upright position and their calorie intake doubled. 
Prognosis for recovery increased by 50%. 
A mother of a patient comatose for 19 years sensed that he was 
depressed. When the doctor gave him an antidepressant, Paxil , he woke up. 
A dentist working on a patient who had been in PVS for 20 years gave him 
Valium to abolish his grimace; he woke up and went home on Valium. 
Such occurrences emphasize our primitive ignorance and our need to 
explore fully the chemical and physiological milieu of the brain in PVS. 
The unwillingness of Catholic physicians to give up on PVS patients has 
been called a "futile vitalism" or a "lack of belief in an afterlife." In reality, 
we are only extending the protection of the human family. We have 
attached value and sought protection for our sister the embryo and our 
brother the fetus . Now we reach out to the patient in a persistent vegetative 
state. It may well be that in recognizing his irreducible value made in the 
image and likeness of God we are giving ourselves the opportunity to study 
him and, as a human subject, to improve his quality of life and find a 
solution to his return to consciousness. 
Relevant Church Teachings 
The definition of euthanasia from the Sacred Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith is as follows: "By euthanasia is understood an action 
or omission which of itself or by intention causes death in order that all 
suffering may be in this way eliminated." Thus the terms of reference 
pertain both to the intention of the will and the method used or omitted. 
The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Facilities lO 
states, "The failure to supply ordinary means of preserving life is 
equivalent to euthanasia. However neither the physician nor the patient is 
obligated to use extraordinary means." 
The Declaration on Euthanasia further states, "When inevitable 
death is imminent in spite of the means used, it is permitted in conscience 
to take the decision to refuse forms of treatment that would only secure a 
precarious and burdensome prolongation of life, so long as the care due to 
the sick person is not interrupted."9 
August, 2004 203 
Pope John Paul II, in addressing the Human Leukemia Conference on 
November 15 , 1985, further clarifies this principle when he states, "It does 
not dispense from the valid therapeutic task of sustaining life nor from the 
normal means of vital support. Science, even when it is unable to heal, can 
and should care for and assist the sick."" He further concretizes the 
statement of principle in the pediatric context in his address to the 11 th 
European Congress on Perinatal Medicine (April 14, 1988) when he states, 
"Not even the parents themselves in the throes of emotion may request 
euthanasia by means of suspension of treatment and nourishment" (This 
was in reference probably to the starvation of handicapped infants in the 
Baby Doe case). 
No one is arguing to use all means, at all costs for all persons in all 
circumstances, particularly those who are imminently dying and unable to 
benefit from the treatment. 
The question really relates to patients who are not dying. The shift in 
emphasis in the so-called "Right to Die" Movement in their propaganda 
and their litigation from dying patients to patients who are not dying is an 
ominous change indeed. The precise question is not whether to treat 
comatose non-dying patients but rather whether to conserve or sustain their 
lives. Since feeding is ordinary care, our choice is really between caring for 
such persons or abandoning them. 
Supporting life, keeping a person alive, does benefit the person 
because it expresses a love of neighbor. It maintains human solidarity that 
affirms the dignity of both patient and caregiver. Human communion with 
and solidarity among persons is a robust bulwark against the euthanasia 
movements. 
Between the first cry of a baby being born and the last breath of an old 
man dying in peace, so runs our course and to those who would introduce 
the curet at one end of life and the knockout drops at the other, we would 
proclaim our unyielding opposition. 
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